Maryland Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 2

Article 4

The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work
and Performance Part II: Craftsmanship and
Decision-Making
William L. Reynolds II

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons
Recommended Citation
William L. Reynolds II, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance Part II: Craftsmanship and Decision-Making, 38
Md. L. Rev. 148 (1978)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: ROLES,
WORK AND PERFORMANCE
PART II:
CRAFTSMANSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING
WILLIAM

I.

L.

REYNOLDS,

II*

INTRODUCTION

This part of the Article' discusses the craftsmanship and
decision-making processes of the Maryland Court of Appeals as
reflected in its published opinions. Although much has been written
on appellate decision-making, surprisingly little attention has been
paid to the process as practiced by a single court, especially the
highest court of a state. Such neglect is unfortunate, for these courts
are responsible for the bulk of legal development in this country. In
the last several years, for example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
has decided a number of cases of widespread importance; among
them were decisions that substantially revised the common law of
3
defamation, 2 held unconstitutional the Maryland obscenity statute
4
and the newly created position of state Special Prosecutor, and
important decisions in the area of medical malpractice. 5 The
importance of those issues to our society requires that the processes
by which the Court arrives at its conclusions be subjected to the
checks of analysis and criticism.
The absence of systematic criticism of the decision-making
process of state appellate courts can be easily explained. Karl
Llewellyn ascribed the problem to a simple lack of interest: "People
have not been interested in the slow job: how and why it happens,
but have wanted a quick, cheap answer: the right way, without
inquiry." 6 Judges, too, are primarily interested in deciding a case,
* A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. Professor of
Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Part I of this Article, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and
Performance, was published in 37 MD. L. REv. 1 (1977).
2. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
3. Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 380 A.2d 1052 (1977).
4. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975).
5. E.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245
(1975).
6. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) 1
suspect that few attorneys read cases carefully. See Smith, The Current Opinions of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas: A Study in Craftmanship, 1 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1946):
"Attorneys read . . . opinions primarily to keep abreast of the latest developments;
any fleeting impulse to criticize is smothered by a groundless fear that such criticism
might ultimately be detrimental to their clients." Shortly after writing that article
George Rose Smith was appointed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.

(148)
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that is in reaching the result they deem fair and proper, rather than
considering the paths to that result. 7 Writing an opinion, as anyone
who has tried to do so - as judge or law clerk, perhaps - knows full

well, is a complex and difficult task. The writer of the majority
opinion must cull from the briefs and lower court opinions relevant
facts, issues, and arguments, and then weigh those data in his own
mind to reach what is often a very difficult decision. Then he must
present his conclusions in a way that can be understood by bench
and bar alike, while holding together what may well be a coalition of
judges who have disparate and, at times, conflicting points of view.
All of this must be done under the very real spur of time, a pressure
that intrudes into every stage of the decision-making process. It is,
therefore, not surprising that questions of craftsmanship are
relegated to a relatively minor position in a judge's allocation of
effort, or that criticism from the bar is often withheld out of
appreciation of the difficulty of the judge's task.
Criticism might also be muted by doubts that it serves any
useful purpose. Undoubtedly, most members of the bar would agree
with Justice Brandeis' observation that "it is more important that
'8
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."
Does the manner in which the court goes about deciding, for
example, that the common law of defamation must be placed on a
basis of negligence have any real importance? Does craftsmanship,
in other words, matter?
In response to these questions, a number of reasons can be
advanced to explain why the decision-making processes of an
appellate court are important. First, the manner in which a court
decides an issue may be related to its understanding of the problem
and, hence, the correctness of the result that is reached. A wellcrafted opinion serves as a signal to both the litigants and the public
that the issue has been fully and fairly considered. It helps to ensure,
moreover, that the law established is indeed that which the court
wishes to adopt. Clarity of thought and precision of expression are
important both to the opinion writer and to those who must deal
with his opinion. The Court's decision-making processes are also
important to the bar, judges of lower courts, and of future Courts of
7. A Karl Llewellyn anecdote is illustrative. When a number of his academic
colleagues were appointed to the bench during the New Deal, Llewellyn asked them to
take notes on how they went about deciding cases. None fulfilled his pledge to do so:
"I tried it. What I could think of, to put down seemed so trifling, or so silly, or
unworthy." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 265.
8. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Appeals, all of whom must understand the precedent and apply it in
other fact settings. In addition, the decision-making process guides
the legal community when it acts in other areas, aiding, for example,
the attorney who wants to know how a question of statutory

construction should be analyzed. Even if the process is not
important in a case for any of these reasons, 9 the Court as an

institution shQuld be practiced in the application of thoughtful
decision-making techniques as an aid to disciplined analysis.
Because the process matters, it is important that a court's
decision-making be subject to critical commentary. It is also
desirable for the Court of Appeals to know that it is writing for a
critical audience - to know that the long hours of labor put into a
decision will be read by someone seeking more than a one-sentence

summary of the holding, someone who is trying to follow the path
taken by the Court. Finally, and perhaps most important, criticism
is a necessary check on a court that is largely ignored by the popular
and professional press' 0 and subject only to very limited review by
the Supreme Court."
In examining the craftsmanship and decision-making processes

of the Court, the manner in which a result is reached, rather than
the result itself, this part of the Article1 2 is loosely based on, inspired
perhaps, by Dean Wigmore's essay on Qualities of Judicial
Decisions.13 Now more than sixty years old, that essay explores
"some of the shortcomings of the usual opinions rendering justice in

the usual State Supreme Court."' 14 Despite its age, the essay, the

9. This would be especially true of what Llewellyn called the "single right
answer" case. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 24-25.
10. Rarely does the Baltimore press, for example, examine critically the work of
the Court. Even the best attempts fail to explore the Court thoroughly. See, e.g.,
Coltman, Mystique of Maryland Judiciary, The Sun (Baltimore) (a series that ran
Sept. 5-9 & 11, 1976), reprinted in THE MARYLAND APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK,
F-23 to F-61 (1977).
11. None of the 1975 Term cases, for example, was accepted for review by the
Supreme Court, although the denial of review provoked dissent in one case, see
Cousins v. Maryland, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
The Court of Special Appeals occasionally uses language that could be taken
as critical of an opinion of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Douglas v. State, 37 Md.
App. 557, 558-59, 378 A.2d 189, 189-90 (1977) (commenting on Howell v. State, 278
Md. 389, 364 A.2d 797 (1976)); Fabritz v. State, 30 Md. App. 1, 6 & n.1, 351 A.2d 477,
481 & n.1 (1976), on remand from 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975).
12. Although this part of the Article concentrates on decisions handed down
during the 1975 Term, it is not limited to that period.
13. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8a (1940). Apparently the only study of a state
court based on the Wigmore method is Smith, supra note 6.
14. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 8a, at 242.
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work of a scholar familiar with an immense number of cases in all
jurisdictions, still provides an excellent framework for examining
the quality of judicial decision-making.
The discussion that follows focuses on the depth and care the
Court of Appeals gives to examining the problems before it. That
examination is too often mechanical and reflexive,15 showing a
reluctance, even when making new law, to examine premises and
policies, a method of decision-making Roscoe Pound styled "mechanical jurisprudence."'1 6 This Article will examine some manifestations
of that problem in craftsmanship and analysis and finally inquire
into the judgment of the Court as expressed in two cases.
II.

CRAFTSMANSHIP

A court writing an opinion is performing a difficult and complex
task. The manner in which it performs that task and the skill with
which it uses the techniques available to it can influence the
decision-making process. Craftsmanship also matters to the bar;
because a court instructs its audience in matters of craftsmanship, it
is important that its techniques be well-honed. 1 7 To some extent
craftsmanship is a luxury, for a court hard pressed by its workload
will concentrate necessarily on the quantity, more than on the
quality of its work. The Court of Appeals, however, has a caseload
light enough to permit it to concentrate on the job at hand, and to do
it well.' 8
The opinions of the current Court of Appeals are generally wellwritten.' 9 They state the facts of the case so that the reader can place

15. This is not a new observation. See Sickels, The Illusion of JudicialConsensus:
Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 100, 103
(1965): "The opinions of the judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals reflect an

uncomplicated faith in legal rules and their literal application by traditional judicial
methods."
16. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). Pound went
on to describe opinions of this school: "conceptions are used, not as premises from

which to reason, but as ultimate solutions." Id. at 620. Wigmore in 1 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 13, § 8a, at 244-45, spoke of the "over-emphasis on the technique of legal
rules in

detail with

corresponding

under-emphasis

on policies,

reasons, and

principles .... The treatment tends to become mechanical. Reasons are lost from
sight." (emphasis in original).

17. Not least important in the audience instructed in craftsmanship are law
students who read the opinions. The transfer of approach from court to student is
often readily apparent.
18. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 27-29.
19. Because the opinion written for the majority is deemed to be that of "the

Court", this Article will avoid mentioning, as far as possible, the names of individual
judges. Whether an opinion does reflect a carefully crafted joint expression of those
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the Court's discussion of law in context. 20 The holding is clearly
stated and precedents used in the opinion are laid out for inspection,
often with an analysis of their significance for the case at bar. By
these means the Court has generally succeeded in establishing, in
Llewellyn's phrase, the "situation-sense" of the issues before it.21
Thus, the reader usually can follow the Court's thoughts concerning
the problem at bar.
At times, however, problems in other areas of craftsmanship
appear. Three that will be discussed are the Court's indiscriminate
use of authority, its practice of over-abundant citation, and its
propensity for adjudication by quotation.
A. Indiscriminate Use of Authority. The Court of Appeals laces
it opinions with references to its own opinions, to those of the Court
of Special Appeals, other state and federal courts, and to various
secondary sources. The effort by the Court to place its decisions in
the framework of existing decision and commentary is commendable, but, unfortunately, much of the authority is used in an
indiscriminate fashion, and some of it should not be used at all.
Precedents come in different sizes and shapes. Consequently, a
court must determine the configuration of a precedent before using it
as authority in a particular situation. The depth of research and the
quality of analysis, the two factors that make a work "authority,"
should be considered by the Court before a work - be it opinion,
treatise, or encyclopedia - is cited as precedent supporting a
conclusion. Wigmore found that "[a]lmost any printed pages, bound
in law-buckram and well advertised or gratuitously presented,
constitute authority fit to guide the Courts. '22 That can hardly be
who join in it is open to doubt. See Schaefer, Precedent & Policy, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 3,
9-10 (1966). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, when led by the great Charles
Doe, provides an example of a court whose opinions did reflect the views of the court:
[Chief Justice) Doe put no stock in the theory that a judicial opinion is the
product and sole responsibility of the judge to whom it is assigned .... To
Doe, the author of an opinion spoke for the entire court. A colleague who
thought a point needed clarification was expected to prepare a memorandum
for the "author" to insert, with or without editing the language. He was not to
fracture the opinion simply to show the world what ideas had originated with
him .... Indeed, others have suggested that he wrote many of the decisions
credited to colleagues, partly because he did not want his own name to appear
too often.
J. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE 212 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
20. However, the factual statement is, at times, overdone. In Haraszti v. Klarman,
277 Md. 234, 236-38, 352 A.2d 833, 834-35 (1976), for example, the Court described at
extreme length the factual background of an "amber light" accident.
21. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 121-26.
22. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 8a, at 243. Wigmore noted that "reliance upon
anonymity is always a mark of literary and juristic crudity." Id.
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said to be true of the Court of Appeals, however, for the quality of the
works relied on by the Court is generally good. 23 Nevertheless, there
are times when some of the sources used by the Court must be
questioned.
An illustration is the occasional use of encyclopedias and other
general treatises. 24 These are useful research tools - proper places to
begin work, but not to end it. The main problem with such works is
that their "narrow conception of the legal process . . . assumes a
mechanical jurisprudence in which the finest art is that of watching
or distinguishing objectively similar or different decisions in order to
put them in the proper slots, push a button, and read the answer on
the slip of paper which comes out of the machine. ' 25 Because such
works collect rather than analyze, they give the impression that
what is desirable is discovery of "the law." Although that search
may help the Court understand the possible impact of a decision, a
court that relies on such sources is less likely to understand the
reasons behind the development of the case law. 26 Not only is that

23. No attempt has been made here to evaluate the substantive correctness of the
Court's use of authority nor to prepare a systematic analysis of the citation practice of
the Court of Appeals. Such an analysis has been made of the practices of the
California Supreme Court. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations:An Empirical
Study of the CitationPracticeof the CaliforniaSupreme Court in 1950, 1960 and 1970,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 381 (1977).

Other than the encyclopedias, see note 24 infra,it is unusual to find the Court
citing questionable works, although it is somewhat jarring to find a reference to such
a venerable piece as T. COOLEY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927), or 0.
FIELD, THE EFFEcT OF AN UNCONSTrrUTIONAL STATUTE (1935); both are relied on in
Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 627-29, 366 A.2d 21, 27-28 (1976). The Perkins Court
found, however, that despite its age, Professor Field's book "remains the most
analytical and comprehensive treatment of the subject." Id. at 628, 366 A.2d 27.
24. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309, 319, 379 A.2d 164, 169 (1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 945 (1978) (reference inter alia to American Jurisprudence2d and an
A.L.R. Annotation); Lore v. Board of Pub. Works, 277 Md. 356, 363, 354 A.2d 812, 816
(1976) (dissenting opinion) (only support for the "general rule" that is opposed to
majority opinion is a reference to American Jurisprudence2d; "dicta" in a recent
Court of Appeals decision was also found to be "supportive"); Murphy v. Yates, 276
Md. 475, 488-89, 348 A.2d 837, 844-45 (1975) (the "general rule" with respect to the
ability of the legislature to vary the powers of the State's Attorney - or his equivalent
in other states - is supported by two quotations from American Jurisprudence2d,
and by a reference to Corpus Juris Secundum). Reliance on such authorities was
apparently more common in the past. Smith, su)5ra note 6, at 91, found 616 citations to
encyclopedias in four volumes of the Arkansas Reporter. Merryman, supra note 23, at
405, Table 14, notes 134 such references by the California Supreme Court in 1950, 46
in 1960, and only 25 in 1970.
25. Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. Rev. 613, 646 (1954).
26. Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court said of legal encyclopedias:
"They are guides to the law, not embodiments of it. This statement of the law is no
sounder than the cases that are cited to support the text. You should always go to the
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understanding crucial to application of principles in new areas, it is
mandatory if a court is to say that an old idea's time has ended. In
addition, a court that relies on such authorities is less likely to be
aware of intellectual ferment in the area. All of these problems are
exacerbated by the strong possibility that judicial reliance on such
27
sources encourages a corresponding reliance on them by attorneys,
thus further diminishing the possibility that the cogent analysis
brought to bear on a problem by a Traynor or a Friendly or a Corbin
will not be brought to the attention of the court.

While "the treatises of learned men" 28 -

of authors such as

Wigmore or Corbin or Prosser - are analytic enough to satisfy any

standard of scholarship, they nevertheless must be handled with
care, for they represent, after all, only the views of the author.2 9 A
court must still be alert for conflicting positions. The Court's
extensive use of the Restatements prepared by the American Law
Institute provides an example of the failure to use secondary sources
carefully. The Court of Appeals has, on occasion, adopted sections

wholesale to support decisions on specific problems 3° while ignoring
or overlooking criticism and even rejection of the Restatement

language by other courts and by commentators. 3 1 Although the
Restatements represent the collective wisdom of a very prestigious

primary rather than to the secondary authority." Merryman, supra note 23, at 405
(quoting Peters, Introduction: A Judge's View of Appellate Advocacy, in STATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALFORNIA

CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE at xviii-xviv [sic] (1966)).
27. The precise source of this problem is difficult to detect. A court must, of
necessity, rely in large measure on research done by counsel. A glance through the
briefs filed in the Court of Appeals shows a somewhat heavier reliance on doubtful
sources by attorneys than by the Court. This is not surprising given the cost of
maintaining an adequate law library and the relative lack of expense of the
encyclopedias; but economic efficiency should not be used to justify the lack of
assistance provided the Court.
28. This phrase is from a provision of the California constitution specifying the
sources of the law. See Merryman, supra note 25, at 647.
29. In contract law, for example, a battle raged for half a century between the
views of Professors Williston and Corbin. The tale of the battle as well as Corbin's
ultimate victory in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts(1974), is told entertainingly
in G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
30. See, e.g.,B.P. Oil Co. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1977), rev'g 31 Md.
App. 221, 356 A.2d 304 (1976); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d
955 (1976) (adopting § 402A of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS (1977)) (strict liability);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 596-97, 350 A.2d 688, 697-98 (1976)
(adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975))
(defamation standard).
31. See notes 114 to 132 and accompanying text infra.
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group, they have at times been subjected to trenchant criticism, 32
and the Court's failure to refer to such problems does not help the
reader believe that its adoption of the Restatement positions are the
33
result of a careful examination of the issue.
Finally, reliance on any author, no matter how prestigious,
should extend no further than the establishment of the acceptance of
a given doctrine and the understanding of possible lines of analysis.
The rest of the job, the decision, belongs to the Court, for it alone is
charged with responsibility for the law it adopts. That must be its
choice, not that of Prosser, or the American Law Institute, or a
majority of other courts.
B. The String Citation.Another problem of judicial style can be
seen in opinions massively bulwarked by citation. Wigmore observed
that these "opinions often give the strong impression of being
discoveries by the judges ....
The lengthy opinions redundantly
quote well-settled platitudes . . . re-proving old truths, which are
34
apparently new and therefore interesting to the writers."
Many opinions of the Court of Appeals exhibit similar characteristics. Elementary propositions are supported by line upon line of
string citations, as if the propositions involved were novel and
controversial and needed to be nailed down firmly. Five cases from
the Court of Appeals are cited in Garland v. Hill,35 for example, as
support for the statement that "mere inadequacy of the purchase
price at a mortgage foreclosure sale is not enough to prevent the
ratification of the sale ..
3.6. In Holmes v. Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board,37 the Court cited fourteen of its own cases,
none decided earlier than 1972, to support three elementary maxims
concerning statutory construction. 38 Lightfoot v. State,39 occupying
less than four pages in the Atlantic Reporter, contains fifty-four case
references, as well as numerous citations to secondary sources, to

32. See generally Merryman, supra note 25, at 629-34. For a recent criticism of

the Restatement's handling of defamation, see Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1977).
33. Restatements are basically nonanalytical. Complex issues are covered in a
few pages of explanation and illustration, and anyone relying solely on a Restatement
will simply not be aware of all the action in the area. A thorough critique of the
approach of the Restatements can be found in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS 758-66 (tent. ed. 1958).
34. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 8a, at 244.
35. 277 Md. 710, 357 A.2d 374 (1976).
36. Id. at 712, 357 A.2d at 375.
37. 278 Md. 60, 359 A.2d 84 (1976).
38. Id. at 66-67, 359 A.2d at 88.
39. 278 Md. 231, 360 A.2d 426 (1976).
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support relatively simple propositions and to show the positions of
various courts on the issue. Only two of the fifty-four cases are
discussed at all. 40 Davis v. Davis41 buttressed its statement that the
"clearly erroneous" standard is to be applied in reviewing child
custody determinations with thirteen citations to Court of Appeals
cases going back to 1960.42
The vice of the string citation is not just aesthetic. An extensive
string citation fosters a belief that the court has not given its full
attention to the problem because it is difficult to believe that it has
read and analyzed all the cases cited in this fashion. Instead, the
collection appears to have been lifted from another source and
placed in the opinion as a substitute for critical analysis of the issue
at hand.43 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the "string"
cases often contain no more than a perfunctory analysis (if that) of
the problem4 4 If a proposition is axiomatic, the Court of Appeals
often seems to feel more secure in weighting the proposition with
"authority" that will anchor it firmly. This should not be necessary.
There is no reason why elementary propositions not fairly called into
question by the issues before the Court need to be supported by
authority. If the Court wishes to refer to an earlier discussion of an
issue, the reference should be to a case which has analyzed the
problem. 45 If the case at bar turns on the problem handled by a
string citation, moreover, a mere listing of authority, even analytical
authority, does not respond adequately to the need for analysis of
46
the problem.

40. Id. at 237, 360 A.2d at 429-30.
41. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1977), rehearingdenied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
42. Fourteen more cases are cited in the same paragraph for more general support
of the same proposition. 280 Md. at 123, 372 A.2d at 233. Rote recitation of precedent
could be justified as a way to ease the work of a burdened court, but that explanation
is not compelling with respect to the Court of Appeals. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at

27-29.
43. If so, the Court should let its audience know whose research it is using. For an

example, see Fisher v. McGuire, 282 Md. 507, 512-14, 385 A.2d 211, 214 (1978).
44. Cf. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (speaking of the period
spanning the Civil War to the First World War as the "Age of Faith"):
This became the age of the string citation - quite as much in the judicial
Nor did the judges make any
opinions as in the learned treatises ....
attempt to explain the reasons for their decisions. It was enough to say: The

rule which we apply has long been settled in this state (citing cases).
Id. at 62-63.
45. This would not be true if the Court followed a rule of stare dictis. The Court
does not.
46. Rote citation is particularly objectionable when the facts of the cases cited
vary from those of the case before the Court, and the Court does not discuss the facts
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Often the "string" seems to have been placed in the opinion as a
counting device, to show that the decision puts the Court of Appeals
firmly in the ranks of the majority on the issue and to overwhelm
with numbers, in order, perhaps, to demonstrate the necessary
correctness of the result. 47 In Davis v. State,48 for example, the Court

held that the Supreme Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama,49 does
not require that a criminal defendant specifically waive certain
rights before his guilty plea can be accepted. To support this holding
the Court of Appeals cited twenty-six state and federal cases and one
secondary source.50 But the Davis Court had already presented a
convincing argument for its position and very little support by
reference to developments in other courts was necessary. 51 A citation'
to a source that had collected those cases, along with a quick
summation of the result, would have been more effective, and
perhaps would have better reflected what the Court had done. In any
event, the Court of Appeals is too good a court to decide cases on the
basis of counting noses and should avoid giving the impression that
it does so.
A final objection to string citations is that they make the
lawyer's job more difficult. 52 The string interrupts the flow of an

opinion and unnecessarily increases its length, making the opinion
more difficult to understand. In addition, encyclopedists and citators
energetically collect the cited cases and make it that much more

of those cases nor any lessons it has drawn which could be applied to the case at bar.
See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309, 318-19, 379 A.2d 164, 168-69 (1977) (citing 28
cases).
47. See also J. REID, supra note 19, at 403: "That Doe mesmerized the other judges
by flashing a string of authorities before their eyes may seem farfetched. Yet this
apparently happened." The "mesmerization" refers to the great freedom Doe
employed in citation. Id.
48. 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976).
49. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
50. 278 Md. at 116-18, 361 A.2d at 120-21.
51. The "string" detracts from the force of the Court's opinion, for the reader
wonders whether the Court is relying on its own analysis or providing a post-hoc
attempt to justify a decision reached by counting the votes of other courts.
52. They may also make the job of a trial court difficult. In Maryland Supreme
Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017 (1977), a sale of goods case, the Court
remanded for several findings concerning the Statute of Frauds. Citation, presumably
to aid litigants and the trial court, was made to nineteen cases, four treatises, and two
law review articles (curiously, no mention was made of RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS, § 217A (1973), which deals with the issue). It is doubtful that the Court of
Appeals had either itself read all the cited works, or realistically expected the trial
court or litigants to do so.
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difficult for counsel by further complicating attempts to trace the
53
considered evolution of a legal principle.
C. Adjudication by Quotation.Another symptom of mechanical
treatment is long quotation from other sources. A number of the
Court's opinions are scissors-and-paste jobs, consisting primarily of
long quotations from source material that are strung together with
connecting paragraphs added by the writer of the majority opinion.
Thus, in Lightfoot v. State,5 4 the Court was faced with the question
whether "failure to consummate the crime is one of the essential
elements of criminal attempt."5 5 The Court's holding that nonconsummation is not an essential element was grounded entirely on a
lengthy quotation from a secondary source5 6 and two short excerpts
from opinions of state supreme courts.5 7 Similarly, in Fleming v.
Prince George's County,58 a medical malpractice case, one of the
questions concerned the admissibility of "life tables." The Court held
that they should have been admitted at trial, but confined its
explanation of this decision to a quotation from a 1915 Court of
Appeals opinion and lengthy excerpts from both McCormick's Law
of Evidence and American Jurisprudence (Second).5 9
There is nothing wrong, of course, with the use of quoted
material in an opinion. The language quoted may be memorable and
may capsulize the problem neatly, or quotation may be necessary to
capture the flavor of what an earlier court was doing, or what it
thought it was doing. Adjudication by quotation must be particularly appealing to hardworking judges as a time-saving device, but it
is also dangerous. Because the pen is a hard task master,
disciplining mightily faulty, analysis and careless expression, the

53. The opinions that have been referred to in this section should be contrasted
with one such as Board of Trustees v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 373 A.2d 626 (1977), a
dispute over tenure status of a faculty member at Bowie State College in which the
Court's dicussion centered on an interpretation of the language of various documents.

Only five cases were cited: one, a "strikingly similar" case, was discussed in some
detail; another was used to support an axiomatic statement; and the remaining three

were a form of "but see" citation to an issue the Court assumed, but did not decide.
54. 278 Md. 231, 360 A.2d 426 (1976).
55. Id. at 233, 360 A.2d at 427.
56. Id. at 235-37, 360 A.2d at 428-29 (quoting R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 552-54
(2d ed. 1969)).
57. 278 Md. at 234-35, 360 A.2d at 428 (quoting Crump v. State, 259 Ind.358, 363,
287 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1972), and State v. Mahoney, 122 Iowa 168, 172, 97 N.W. 1089,
1091 (1904)).
58. 277 Md. 655, 358 A.2d 892 (1976).
59. Id. at 684-86, 358 A.2d at 907-08.
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"process of justification"0 - the need to decide in writing - should
not be subject to short cuts. Reliance on the written work of others,
in short, may shield a judge from the necessity of working through
his position as clearly as he would if he had been forced to prepare
for consumption by his audience, a statement of his own to justify
61
the results reached.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Analytic Framework. In reaching its decisions a court has
available to aid it a wealth of material: case law, statutes,
commentary, and arguments by counsel. These data, however, need
a framework in which to be analyzed. It is important that the Court
establish a framework within which it can evaluate such information. The framework should also be articulated, a process that serves
three ends: first it helps insure that the Court receives necessary
information from counsel; second, articulation in advance of
decision helps avoid the appearance of ad hoc decision-making; and,
finally, it helps sharpen the Court's own focus when it approaches
resolution of the problem.
The use of historical materials provides a good example. Many
of the Court's opinions reflect an effort to understand the historical
framework of a problem. Skillful use of history can set the
background for interpretation of written and unwritten law, show
the development of principles and help to reach an understanding of
the ends sought by earlier judges and legislators.6 2 In Secretary of
Transportationv. Mancuso, 63 for example, the Court was faced with
the question whether certain bonds constituted "debt" within the
meaning of a provision of the Maryland Constitution restricting the
state's debt. The Court inquired into the purpose of the insertion of
the debt-restriction clause into the constitution and used its
determination of that purpose to support its resolution of the case.
60. See R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECIsION 27 (1961). Wasserstrom, in
contrasting the "process of justification" with the "process of discovery," emphasized
the need to attempt to justify even intuitively derived decisions.
61. See, e.g., Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977), in which well
over half of the opinion consists of quotations from other cases. Each quotation "fits"
in the opinion, but the Court failed to analyze any of them carefully. Instead, the
Court at the end of the opinion constructed a holding without referring to the cases
quoted or the reasons developed therein. The quotations, in other words, do not form a
unit with the holding.
62. This is done, of course, even when the Court traces the elaboration of a recent
doctrine. For a modern "historical" analysis, see State v. Ensor, 277 Md. 529, 356 A.2d
259 (1976), wherein the Court leads the reader through constitutional and legislative
developments on its way to a solution of the problem.
63. 278 Md. 81. 359 A.2d 79 (1976).
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On the other hand, history's lessons are often obscure and their
relevance to present-day cases may be slight. Use of historical
reference to demonstrate the antiquity of a concept may keep a
bemused court from critically analyzing a problem. 64 History also
has a way of presenting its lessons in a way responsive to the
questions asked of it. Thus, legislative history may be turned to in
order to see if the draftsmen intended a solution to the particular
problem at bar, or, on the other hand, to see if they precluded a
particular answer suggested by one of the parties. 65 Murphy v.
Yates 66 provides an example. A divided Court of Appeals held in
Murphy that the State Prosecutor Act unconstitutionally infringed
upon the constitutional powers of the several state's attorneys. While
both the majority and dissenting opinions examined historical
materials, their use of that material differed significantly. The
dissent resorted to history in an apparent effort to see if its
interpretation of the key section of the state constitution6 7 was
precluded by the original understanding or by later developments.6 8
The majority, on the other hand, seemingly turned to historical
material in an effort to find an answer there - that is, an answer to
be implied from the data - to the actual question presented by the
case. 69 Because different approaches can lead to different results, it
is important for the Court to develop and then articulate the reasons
why it believes the historical material to be significant.
Development of an articulated position on an analytic issue such
as historical relevance, like the development of positions on most

64. An example is Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 277
Md. 626, 627, 356 A.2d 555, 556 (1976), presenting the question "whether the doctrine
of sovereign immunity precludes a defendant's assertion of limitations as a defense to
an action brought by the State in its sovereign capacity." There the Court stated: "We

begin our discussion with a reference to 21 James 2, c. #16 (1623), from which our
statute of limitations is derived." That reference is the end of the discussion of the
Stuart statute, except to note that it was in force in Maryland "until at least 1715,"
and that "[iut is the progenitor" of several current Maryland statutes. Id. at 628, 356
A.2d at 556. Although interesting, the "reference" adds nothing to an opinion that
makes no attempt to analyze the wisdom of sovereign immunity. Indeed, the antiquity
of the doctrine may have kept the Court from analyzing the issue.
65. The legislative history may also suggest any one of a great number of in.between solutions. See generally Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in
ConstitutionalInterpretation,31 U. CH. L. REv. 502 (1964).
66. 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975), noted in 37 MD.L. REv. 81 (1977).
67. The selection stated: 'The State's Attorney shall perform such duties and
receive such salary as shall be prescribed by the General Assembly.
MD. CONST.
art. V, § 9 (prior to 1976 amendments).
68. 276 Md. at 504-10, 348 A.2d at 853-56 (Levine, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 480-96, 348 A.2d at 840-48.
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questions of legal philosophy, is not a common trait among lawyers;
the glory of the common law has been exposition, not theory. 70
Consequently, it is not surprising to find little discussion in opinions
of the role of the judge in our society. The lack of discussion does not,
of course, necessarily indicate a lack of thought on the relationship
between court and legislature and the source of values in common
law decision-making. Failure to elaborate its own thinking on
questions of philosophy, however, can hinder the Court's leadership
of the judicial branch of government, for adequate guidance
concerning these questions is not given the lower courts; and failure
to reflect on those questions may hinder the Court's performance of
its own role as decision-maker.
Nowhere is the reluctance to examine problems of theory more
marked than in cases involving relations between the Court and
legislature. One example comes from cases raising questions
concerning the use that should be made of legislative action (or
inaction) that has not become "law." Reliance on materials such as
the text of a defeated bill or a joint resolution raises difficult
questions with respect to the constitutional relationship between
executive and legislature. The use of such materials is implicitly
limited by the veto power of the executive - an essential component
in the constitutionally prescribed method of creating law.7 1 Although
the Court has relied upon legislative actions that were not translated
into law to -support its opinions, it has given no hint in those cases
that it recognizes the problems involved in doing so, especially those
problems associated with the structure of the Maryland govern72
ment.
Another example of the Court's reluctance to address questions
concerning the relationship of court and legislature is found in
70. "It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines
the principle afterwards." Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L.
REV. 1 (1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1931).
71. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 1394-1406.

72. See, e.g., Calvert Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Employment &
Social Servs., 277 Md. 372, 376-77, 381, 357 A.2d 839, 841, 843-44 (1976), in which the
Court placed great weight upon an 1858 resolution by the General Assembly and
legislation passed by that body in 1974, but vetoed by the governor. Both actions were
said to show ("clearly" and "plainly") the General Assembly's position on the
problem. While the Court's characterization was surely correct, that should have been
only the beginning of the analysis. It should also have asked why it was relevant - if
at all - to a court exercising its decisional powers what the legislature thought when
the thoughts were not translated into "law," that is, into a statute.

Calvert can be contrasted with Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399,
406-07, 354 A.2d 817, 820-21 (1976). The court in Hardenrefused, with reasons given,
to draw an inference from the defeat of specific legislation.
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Carpenter v. Davies, 73 an action by a real estate broker for a
commission allegedly due him. The seller argued that his contract
with the broker was not enforceable because it lacked a "termination
date," thereby violating a statute authorizing suspension of the
license of any broker who "accept[s] a listing contract to sell
property unless such contract provides for a definite termination
date . . . ."74 This argument raised the interesting question of how
to define "illegal" contracts, as that definition relates to the
implication of a private defense from the delegation of authority to
an administrative agency. 75 The Court avoided consideration of the
issue, however, stating that "[i]f it is the intent of the General
Assembly that in circumstances such as this the broker should be
76
precluded from recovering commissions, no doubt it will so state."
This approach, of course, begs the question of whether the General
Assembly did so "intend." The Court, without discussing the wisdom
of doing so, concluded that an enactment of a coordinate branch of
government should be given no effect beyond its express terms, and
should not be used as a basis for reasoning by the Court on the
content of "public policy. ' 77 That may well be a sustainable
proposition, but the opinion of the Court does not establish its
validity, and the failure to do so may mean that the statute was not
given as broad a scope as the legislature would have desired.
A more common problem requiring analysis of structural
relationships is that of statutory interpretation. One of the most
important jobs of any court is to apply statutes - the expressed
desires of a coequal branch of government 78 - to problems brought

73. 276 Md. 174, 345 A.2d 58 (1975).

74.

MD. ANN. CODE

art. 56, § 224(o) (1972).

75. Thus, the statute authorized the Maryland Real Estate Commission to
suspend a broker's license for failure, inter alia, to supply a termination date. Id.
§ 224(a). Such a drastic remedy could easily be found to be a legislative expression of
"public policy," contracts in violation of which have been said to be unenforceable.
See 6 A. CORBIN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1375 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 512 (1932). Certainly unenforceability would be an effective way of promoting
compliance with the statutory requirement of a written termination date.
The Carpenter Court seemed bemused by the notion that even if the written
contract were ineffective, an oral agreement existed. That, of course, is still not
responsive to the public policy argument.
76. 276 Md. at 177, 345 A.2d at 60.
77. This would be akin to reasoning from the "equity" of a statute. See Justice
Harlan's excellent opinion in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970). See generally Comment, Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law, 82 YALE
L.J. 258 (1972).
78. The doctrine of separation of powers is expressly provided for in the Maryland
Constitution. MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 8.
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before the Court. In most situations a court is not the primary
addressee of the statute; instead, it is directed to other actors in
society: members of the executive branch, business persons,
consumers, labor leaders, and so on. Such persons need guidance
concerning the manner in which statutes will be interpreted to assist
them in ordering their affairs with a minimum of risk. 9 Because the
Court of Appeals hears (and can hear) very few of the problems that
involve questions of interpreting and applying statutes that come to
the attention of the judiciary, 8° the great bulk of this work must be
performed by the lower courts without effective supervision from the
Court of Appeals. To ensure both uniformity of result and proper
allocation of power and responsibility among the branches of
government, judges should approach problems of statutory interpretation with a consistent theory articulated by the state's highest
court. Unfortunately, if recent decisions are representative, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, like most American courts, has not
developed and elaborated, through analysis of the constitutional
roles of the branches of government, an approach to the problem of
statutory interpretation.8 ' Instead, the Court's approach in this area
generally has been either to make no reference to an analytic
82
approach or to substitute empty phrases and mechanical citations
in place of an effort to grapple with the sometimes exceedingly
difficult structural and linguistic problems posed by interpretation
cases.8 3 Further, even when the Court does refer to a method of
interpretation, it pays little or no attention to the test it has just
identified.
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Board of County Commission84
ers, for example, the Court was asked to invalidate a county
79. For a discussion of costs associated with uncertainty created by judicial
opinions, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 419-27 (2d ed. 1977).
80. Of course the great bulk of statutory interpretation does not come to the
attention of any court. The interpretations by government officials, for example, are
generally accepted by those whom they affect. Acceptance, however, does not obviate
the need for guidance.
81. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 1201: "The hard truth of the matter
is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted and consistently
applied theory of statutory interpretation."
82. Mechanical citations are one facet of the "string" citation problem. See text
accompanying notes 47 to 53 supra.
83. Failure to analyze interpretation issues can be found in other areas as well. In
contract cases, for example, the court often relies on shibboleths without explaining
why (and how) they have any relevance to the case at bar. See, e.g., Canaras v. Lift
Truck Servs., 272 Md. 337, 356, 322 A.2d 866, 876 (1974) ("language in a contract
prepared and concluded by one party is to be construed against that party if there is
any ambiguity or uncertainty . .
").
84. 278 Md. 26, 358 A.2d 241 (1976).
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ordinance that gave "discounts" for advance payments of property
taxes and made the percentage of the discount depend upon the size
of the tax bill, with lower tax bills receiving a higher "discount." A
public utility (that paid sixty-three percent of the county's real estate
taxes),85 asserted that this ordinance conflicted with the statute
authorizing the grant of "discounts. '8 6 The Court's discussion of the
problem was preceded by a statement concerning interpretation:
[T]he cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out
the real legislative intention. In determining that intention, we
consider the language of an enactment in its natural and
ordinary signification; only when the statute in question is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning need we look elsewhere to
ascertain the legislative intention. Md. Nat'l Cap. P. & P. v.
Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 555-56, 325 A.2d 748 (1974); Radio Com.,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 Md. 82, 93, 314 A.2d 118 (1974);
Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393-94; 306 A.2d
7
534 (1973).8
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain either how it knew what
the "cardinal rule of construction" was or why the method described
for "determining that intention" is a good one. Nor do the cases
referred to by the Court provide answers to those questions. Thus,
neither in the case at bar, nor in any case cited, did the Court give an
indication that it had thought through the problems involved.
Instead, it was content to substitute maxims concerning statutory
interpretation for analysis. Hence, while the Court has in some cases
provided an articulated standard for interpretation - unlike its
practice in cases involving governmental structure - it has failed to
elaborate why that is the proper standard to use.
Maxims - that is, time-tested formulae such as the "cardinal
rule" quoted in the preceding paragraph - are useful because they
88
can capture in shorthand form a common approach to a problem.
Unfortunately, they can also be used as "magic words"8 9 incanted in
85. Id. at 29, 358 A.2d at 243.
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 48(b) (1975) provides: "any county ...
taxes may allow such discounts for payments made prior to ...

as to its own

October 1 ....

.

87. 278 Md. at 31, 358 A.2d at 244.
88. As "something fundamental, something permanent," Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 370 (1929),
maxims have long been used by common law judges as evocation of deeply held and
widely shared beliefs. See id. at 375-77.
89. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 621 (1908)
(quoting a passage from William James describing the great part "magic words have
always played" in metaphysics) (emphasis in original).
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place of reflection on a problem. 90 This is true even of the hoariest of
doctrines; in statutory interpretation the use of maxims is tricky,
indeed. References to maxims, therefore, should be made cautiously
and with evidence that the Court is merely referring to its own
earlier analysis of the problem. One problem with the use of maxims
is that there is no general agreement among courts and commentators concerning the wisdom of the various maxims that might be
selected with respect to a particular problem. 91 Should legislative
"intent" be carried out, for example, if the result is inconsistent with
deeply held values? 92 What does the Court mean by "intention"
when it speaks of the "cardinal rule" of construction? Does this refer
to a perceived hypothetical answer given by the legislature to the
particular problem before the court, or does it refer to a more
generalized "purpose" that body had in mind at the time of
enactment? 93 Those questions are difficult ones; the answers to
them, however, are important for the resolution of particular
problems and for the light they shed on how a court views its role in
our society.
In addition, a court's method of arriving at a determination of
the content of legislative intention raises a number of problems that
the Court does not discuss. The Court's initial focus on language
with resort to extrinsic evidence only in cases of ambiguity, as
illustrated by the above quotation from the tax discount case, is a
restatement of the "plain meaning rule. '94 Like other "rules" (such
as the parol evidence rule) that purport to rely only on internal
evidence to discover ambiguity, it has been cogently criticized as
simplistic and unworkable. 95 "There is no surer way to misread any
90. See, e.g., State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 942 (1976), in which the Court referred approvingly to almost every known canon
of construction.
91. Even if the general acceptance of maxims selected by the Court was a valid
reason for their use, see text accompanying notes 47 to 53 supra, such acceptance is
virtually impossible. A famous list of maxims and countermaxims of statutory
interpretation are found in Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision &
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
401-06 (1950). There Llewellyn listed 28 "Canons of Construction," along with a
contradictory canon for each. For example, the maxim, "[al statute cannot go beyond
its text," is contrasted with, "[t]o effectuate its purpose a statute may be implemented
beyond its text." Id. at 401.
92. That it should not be carried out in these circumstances is often referred to as
the "Golden Rule" of statutory interpretation. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 230 (1975).
93. See id. at 87-88.
94. See id. at 229-33; H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 1145.
95. See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" &
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
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document than to read it literally," 96 Learned Hand once wrote, and
recognition of the need to evaluate language in context is now
widespread. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the harm in
looking at extrinsic evidence - though its probative value may be
slight - in order to understand the goals of the legislature when it
acted.
Possibly the Court recognizes these difficulties with the plain
meaning rule; certainly it pays only lip service to its own
formulation of it. In the tax discount case, for example, the Court,
after looking at the statutory wording stated that "it is unnecessary
for us to look elsewhere," 97 but went on to marshal evidence of the
purpose of tax discount legislation in general, 9 of the particular
piece of legislation in question, 99 and of holdings in other states. 10°
Although some of this evidence did lend support to its holding that
the act forbade discriminatory "discounts,"' 10 1 the Court's use of it
10 2
was hardly consonant with the Court's own interpretive model.
(1975). Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, expressly rejected
the plain meaning rule in Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426

U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976).
For a concise and trenchant criticism of the standard formulation of the parol
evidence rule, see Corbin, The Interpretationof Words & the ParolEvidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965).
96. Giuseppe v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
97. 278 Md. at 31, 358 A.2d at 244. The Court buttressed the "plain meaning" that
it discovered by referring to "[a] primary meaning of the word 'discounts' in Webster's
Third New International Dictionary .... ." Id. That reference raises two major
problems, one with the case, and the other with the plain meaning rule. First, at least
one other contemporary dictionary, the Random House Dictionary of the English
Language (1966), does not define "discounts" in the way Webster's Third does.
If "discounts" has such a "plain" meaning, why this discrepancy in dictionary
definitions? Second, a major problem with the plain meaning rule is defining the time
at which the meaning is "plain." The act in question dates back at least to 1929, but
the Court did not explain why it used a contemporary (1973) dictionary as it reference,
rather than one that would explain how the members of the General Assembly in 1929
might have defined the term.
98. 278 Md. at 32, 358 A.2d at 244.
99. Id. at 32, 358 A.2d at 245. The opinion cited the subtitle to the statute: "When
Taxes are Payable." It does not explain why that subtitle precludes the interpretation
of the statute offered by the county.
100. Id. at 32, 358 A.2d at 244-45. The Court cited a 1928 Pennsylvania case and
two from Kentucky dated 1916 and 1895. Again, the Court did not explain the
relevance of these cases to the problem.
101. Query the position of the Court if the county had granted a discount that
favored large taxpayers such as the utility. Discounts relating to savings based on
volume are of course not unusual in the business world.
102. For other cases in which extrinsic evidence is brought into an opinion after
statutory language has been found to be "unambiguous" or to have a "plain
meaning," see Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360-63, 369 A.2d 82,
86-88 (1977) (recitation of plain meaning rule followed by a notation that a finding of
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The tax discount case at least provided a model for interpretation. The plain meaning rule, however, is not referred to in many
decisions. In some cases, it appears to have been jettisoned because
10 3
its application would have been embarrassing. In Phifer v. State,
for example, the petitioner had been convicted of a violation of the
Maryland Fair Election Practices Act 10 4 on the ground that she had
acted as a member of a "political committee" but had not filed
required reports with the Election Board. The central issue in the
case was the definition of "committee," defined by the statute as

"any combination of two or more persons . . .formed in any . . .

manner which assists or attempts to assist in any manner the
promotion of the success or defeat of any candidate.

. .

submitted to

a vote at any election."' 10 5 The petitioner's alleged "committee" had
consisted of herself and one Dr. Weems, from whom she had solicited
a contribution for a newspaper advertisement opposing the reelection of State Senator Edward Hall. Despite the apparent close
correspondence between that conduct and that proscribed by the
statutory language (a "combination.

.

. formed.

. .

to assist. . .the

...defeat of any candidate"), the Court made no effort to explain
why the "meaning" of the Act was not "plain" on "its face," before
proceeding to explain why the petitioner's actions did not fall under
the Act. While the Court's opinion as to why the petitioner was not
involved with a "political committee" seems sensible enough, it is
plainly inconsistent with earlier -

and later - pronouncements by

the Court on methods of statutory interpretation, 10 6 particularly with
its sometimes avowed adherence to the plain meaning rule.
B. Failure to Elaborate. Another symptom of mechanical
treatment of a problem occurs when a court slides quickly through,
statutory policy by the Court of Special Appeals in an earlier case was "persuasive");
Gossard v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd., 279 Md. 309, 311-12, 368 A.2d 443,
444-45 (1977) (statutory term found to be "unambiguous," following a statement that
"[w]e perceive no basis in policy, precedent or common sense for [appellant's
contention]"); Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Stith, 277 Md. 595, 598, 356 A.2d 272, 274
(1976).
103. 278 Md. 72, 359 A.2d 210 (1976).
104. MD. CODE ANN. art. 33, §§ 26-1 to -21 (1976).
105. Id. § 1-1(a)(14).
106. Inconsistent application (or nonapplication) of other canons of construction
can be found. Compare, e.g., State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275, cert. denied,
425 U.S. 942 (1976) with Howell v. State, 278 Md. 389, 364 A.2d 797 (1976). Both cases
involved construction of penal statutes, and both invoked the maxim calling for
"strict construction of penal statutes." In Fabritz, however, the Court believed it
proper to consider the question of legislative intent in order to give effect to "the
objectives and purposes of the enactment." 276 Md. at 422, 348 A.2d at 279. No such
statement or search was made in Howell. Not surprisingly, the state won in Fabritz
and lost in Howell.
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or skips entirely, important steps in its explanation of the road to its
result. A fully reasoned explanation serves several important
functions: it helps legal consumers understand what the court was
trying to do; it provides a basis for analysis, criticism, and analogy;
and most important, it is a necessary aid to the court's understanding and resolution of the problem. 10 7 Our common law system of
precedent, in short, depends upon reasoned articulation by judges of
the reasons for the decision.10 8 While it is impossible - and
unnecessary - for a court to explain everything conceivably at issue
in a case, a court's expression of the important steps in its reasoning
on the problems central to its resolution of the case is essential to the
performance of its tasks. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals
sometimes fails to do this, instead reaching its results by a quick
conclusion. Opinions decided in that fashion are often buttressed by
authority, but frequently give no indication that the Court has
thought about why it has reached the result. Harris v Jones,0 9 for
example, presented, as "a case of first impression in Maryland," the
question whether "intentional infliction of emotional distress"
should be recognized as a "new and independent tort."' 1 0 In agreeing
with the Court of Special Appeals that the tort should be recognized,
the Court of Appeals made copious references to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,"' to several cases from other jurisdictions, and to
law review articles.'1 2 Those references were employed, however, to
show the sweep and limits of the new tort. While the Court's
discussion is interesting and instructive, it does not give much aid to
the reader trying to understand why it was thought wise to adopt the
tort in the first place. To be sure, the reader can work backwards: the
discussion of the scope of the rule aids an understanding of why it
was adopted. Nevertheless, it would be reassuring and helpful if the
Court were to lead its audience down the path it took, the path that

107. See note 60 supra.
108. If authority is needed for this proposition, see Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle

of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 751 (1970):
In sum, judicial responsibility connotes far more than a mechanical
application of given rules to new sets of facts. It connotes the recurring
formulation of new rules to supplement or displace the old. It connotes the
recurring choice of one policy over another in that formulation, and an
articulation of the reasons therefor.

109. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
110. Id. at 561, 380 A.2d at 611.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
112. 281 Md. at 565-72, 380 A.2d at 613-17.
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led the Court to conclude that the establishment of this rule would
113
help achieve a better society.
The absence of that type of analysis on essential points can be
found even in the best opinions. In JacronSales Co. v. Sindorf,114 a
private, nonmedia defamation case, the Court of Appeals discussed
fully and thoroughly the Supreme Court's decisions in the area,
concluding that those opinions left state courts free to impose
liability in such circumstances. 15 After noting decisions in several
other states in recent years on the issue of whether to adopt either a
common law negligence or a New York Times v. Sullivan116
standard, the Court held that "a standard of negligence, as set forth
in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975)
•

.

. must be applied in cases of purely private defamation." ' 1 7 The

only explanation offered for this choice was that "adoption of a
negligence standard in cases of purely private defamation hardly
introduces a radical concept to tort law."" l8 However desirable
symmetry with other areas of tort law may be, that by itself hardly
compelled adoption of the negligence standard, 119 especially in light
of the existence of contrary decisions in other jurisdictions.' 2 0 The
Court should have asked questions that went to the wisdom of
choosing one standard over another: Why are defamation actions
permitted at all? What are the costs to free speech and reputation
likely to be under either standard? How successful was the common
law rule in achieving these goals? Those are difficult questions to be
sure, but they are the types of questions that should be faced by a
court engaged in the declaration of law;' 21 in addressing them the

113. Such an explanation should also tell the reader why the Court believes that it
should attempt to achieve such a society.

114. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
115. Id. at 594, 350 A.2d at 696.
116. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

117. 276 Md. at 596, 350 A.2d at 697.
118. Id. The Court also noted that a negligence standard is now applied to
determine whether a publication is defamatory and, in some jurisdictions, to defeat
common law conditional privilege.
119. Ironically, the Court moved away from the negligence standard in another
area of tort law, products liability, some months after the Jacron decision when it
adopted the strict liability approach of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), discussed at
notes 123 to 132 and accompanying text infra.
120. Several of these decisions were noted by the Court. 276 Md. at 595, 350 A.2d at
697.
121. The Jacron Court in fact engaged in such an analysis with respect to another
question - whether a distinction should be made between media and nonmedia
defendants. 276 Md. at 590-94, 350 A.2d at 694-96.
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Court would have helped satisfy several institutional needs. The
most important of these is the need to analyze the problem in an
effort to achieve the best result possible; the issues may be difficult
but they are not incapable of analysis. Second, the reasoning
employed by the Court has an important impact in deciding
analogous cases that may arise in the future. Third, the process of
reasoning may help the Court perceive problems with one of the
1 22
standards that might make that choice seem unwise.
A more subtle form of this problem is illustrated by Phipps v.
General Motors Corp.,123 the case in which the Court adopted the
doctrine of strict products liability as set out in section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 24 The importance of the decision, its
departure from settled common law principles, as well as the
25
criticism occasionally leveled at the concept of strict liability,
would lead the reader to expect a complete explanation of the
decision to adopt the Restatement's position. That did not happen in
Phipps. Instead, the Court justified its adoption of strict liability by
listing several reasons advanced by other courts for adopting strict
liability, by referring to several law review articles, and by quoting
from the official comment to section 402A. 1 26 It then concluded: "We
find [these] reasons persuasive,' 1 27 restating the reasons given in the
Comment. 128 What the Phipps opinion failed to do was to explain
why the listed justifications were proper premises for the Court to
employ, 1 29 why, in other words, our society views the results that will

122. This is true of the standard adopted in Jacron.See Comment, The Maryland
Court of Appeals: State Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
36 MD. L. REV. 622, 632-36 (1977).
123. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), noted in 37 MD. L. REV. 158 (1977).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

125. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 79, at 134-42, which contains a summary of
arguments for and against strict liability. A critical article is McKean, Products
Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1970).
126. 278 Md. at 351-52, 363 A.2d at 962-63. Earlier, the Court had said that

"various justifications for imposing strict liability in tort on manufacturers have been
advanced by the Courts." Id. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958. The Court then listed four
reasons substantially repeated in the Comments to § 402A. Id.

127. 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963.
128. Id. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963. Brushed off in equally conclusory fashion was
the contention that enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code preempted the

Court's assertion of common law powers in the area of products liability. Id. at
349-50, 363 A.2d at 962. In fact, the Court devoted more attention to an analysis of its
own precedents in the area and to a damage issue concerning loss of consortium.
129. The Court's only rationalization of strict liability was apparently this

assertion:
[T]here is no reason why a party injured by a defective and unreasonably

dangerous product, which when placed on the market is impliedly represented
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be achieved by section 402A as proper ones to seek. As in Jacron,
that type of explanation would have been difficult, for it requires
inquiry into the sources and content of values and goals13 and can
lead to the recognition of conflict among competing basic principles.
It is beside the point that excellent arguments for section 402A can
be found in some of the cited material, for it is the job of the Court to
develop, analyze, and resolve those arguments in its opinion, both as
a disciplinary aid to its own decision-making and in order to explain
to its constituency how it has determined which principles of society
led it to "find [these] reasons persuasive." An opinion, in short,
should provide internal evidence that the court has wrestled with the
problem sufficiently so as to understand fully what it is doing.
131
Phipps does not provide that evidence.
The failure by the Court adequately to underpin its decision in
Phipps presents other difficulties. A number of courts have found
serious deficiencies in section 402A, leading in some cases to the

adoption of significant modifications of the Restatement language. 132 The Phipps opinion, however, gave no hint that the Court
was aware of such problems; instead, it suggests that the Court
adopted the Restatement position on strict liability blindly through wholesale incorporation unaccompanied by objective
criticism. It would be comforting to know that the Court had
recognized the deficiencies in section 402A and had then explained
why those problems did not lead to a rejection of some of the
language of that section. That analysis would have helped maintain
confidence in the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of the Court's
decision-making. The discussion would also have helped instruct

as safe, should bear the loss of that injury when the seller of that product is in
a better position to take precautions and protect against the defect.
id. at 352-53, 366 A.2d at 963. Absent an attempt to explain the bases for this
assertion, it is nothing more than an appeal to the reader's intuition ("we hold these
truths to be self-evident").
130. This could be done, for example, by reference to statutory developments that
suggest, by analogy, the way society feels about such conflicts.
131. Appropriate here is the comment of a seasoned appellate judge that "there is
no test of a decision equal to the discipline of having to compose an opinion. Without
written opinions judicial mistakes would proliferate beyond knowing and beyond
knowability." Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L.
REV., 197, 201 (1967).

132. This is particularly true with respect to the "unreasonably dangerous"
language of § 402A(1). See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-35,
501 P.2d 1153, 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-43 (1972). Phipps does discuss in some
detail the question of design defects, the alleged basis for liability in the case. 278 Md.
at 344-45, 363 A.2d at 959. A summary of problems with the language of § 402A can
be found in 37 MD. L. REV. 158, 163-64 (1977).
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lower courts and litigants in how to handle problems that may arise
in the future, and would provide a source of analogical reasoning for
problems arising in related areas. Finally, a legislator concerned
about the problem could have been guided in his actions by the
Court's elaboration of those.
C. Rush to Judgment. Several cases decided by the Court of
Appeals in the last few years have followed the questionable
procedure of handing down an order soon after argument, and then
following the order sometime later with an opinion. The use of this
process is understandable, for there is often pressure on the Court to
reach a decision, to settle an issue quickly. There are, however,
serious problems with that process. First, the Court in making its
decision has denied itself, the litigants, and the public the benefit of
a decision whose analytic input has been tested in writing - a
process that can often lead to a change in viewpoint as the writer
attempts to justify the decision. There is also the danger that the
analysis of the problem found in the opinion will be influenced by
the result already reached. It is hard after all, if one has publicly
133
pronounced a statute unconstitutional, to retract that statement.
Thus, the writer in such a situation will settle down to sustained
research and analysis much as an attorney sits down to write a
brief: not to search for truth, but to make an advocate's argument for
a position already staked out. 134 Not only will this deny justice in the

case at bar, 35 but, because the decision has precedential value, it
may affect other decisions as well. It is impossible to say whether
those problems are present in any of the cases decided in this
fashion by the Court of Appeals. Several such cases have significant
defects, however, and it is possible that this mode of decision-making
36
contributed to those problems.
133. This is surely one of the reasons for the rigid secrecy surrounding judges'
decision conferences.
134. As the British Holmes observed, "it is an error to argue in front of your data.
You find yourself insensibly twisting them round to fit your theories." A. DOYLE, The
Adventure of Wisteria Lodge, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 876 (1930).
135. A description of machinations on the Supreme Court occasioned by this type
of decision can be found in Mason, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's
Views, 69 HARV. L. REv. 806, 813-31 (1956).
136. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, haste may have had an impact
on decision-making in two other cases: Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378
A.2d 1326 (1977); Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130,
339 A.2d 291 (1975) (for criticism, see the dissenting opinion, id. at 144, 339 A.2d at
299). The former case presented inter alia the question whether a statute that had
been passed after the end of the constitutionally limited 90-day legislative session was
valid. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 15(1). The Court's opinion cited several precedents
from Maryland and other states to support its holding that an affidavit from a
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There are, of course, some rare cases that raise issues - such as
whether a name should be placed on an election ballot - in which a
quick decision is indeed necessary. In those instances 137 the caseload
of the Court is such that it can drop everything else and devote its
complete attention to the resolution of the problem at bar. 138 The
Court should decide and expose the reasons for its decisions in such
cases at the same time. Its audience would then know that, because
the decision was rendered with haste, this is a "precedent pianissimo."1

39

Similar to the common rush to judgment cases are those in
which the Court of Appeals "jumps" the case out of the Court of
Special Appeals. 140 Again, this is generally an undesirable practice,
for the decision is rendered under less than optimal conditions.
Because both types of cases increase the possibility of imperfect
decisions, the wisdom of the Court in expediting cases in this
manner is questionable. In addition, this type of expedition can
leave the impression that the Court is more interested in deciding the
issue than the case.

legislator is insufficient to rebut "the strong presumption of validity which attaches to
a duly authenticated act in Maryland." 281 Md. at 238, 378 A.2d at 1336. The Court
failed, however, to analyze the separation of powers problems beyond its reliance on
the stated presumption. An issue that raises the question of who is to be the ultimate
arbiter of the state's constitution deserved better handling.
The three other decisions since 1975 decided in this fashion are State Dep't of
Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 383 A.2d 51 (1978);
Mayor of Baltimore v. American Fed. of State, County, and Mun. Employees, 281 Md.
463, 379 A.2d 1031 (1977); In re Appeals Nos. 1022 & 1081, 278 Md. 174, 359 A.2d 556
(1976) (per curium).
137. Only in Mayor of Baltimore v. American Fed. of State, County, and Mun.
Employees, 281 Md. 463, 379 A.2d 1031 (1977), and Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 339 A.2d 291 (1975), is the argument for rapid
decision at all persuasive. There were, to be sure, political pressures in most cases to
decide quickly. The Court, however, should be able to resist such pressure.
138. This is the practice in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. New York
Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). At oral argument in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case), the Court was urged to issue an
immediate opinion. Justice Jackson responded:
It frequently happens - I myself have changed my opinion after reading
opinions of the other members of this Court. And I am as stubborn as most.
But I sometimes wind up not voting the way I voted in conference because the
reasons of the majority didn't satisfy me. I would oppose handing down any
decision in this case until the opinions are ready because the opinions are
even more important than the decisions.
Quoted in A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAw CASE 123-24 (1958).
139. The phrase is Justice Schaefer's, from Schaefer, Precedent & Policy, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 3, 7 (1966).
140. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 19-24.
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Two cases concerning automatic removal in Maryland illustrate
14
well the problems of expediting decisions. In Davidson v. Miller, 1
the Court of Appeals held that section 8 of article IV of the Maryland
Constitution, which provides for the automatic removal of civil
actions to "another court," was unenforceable because it deprived
Baltimore City litigants of the equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment. The basis of the decision was that because
there was no other court in each county to which the case could be
transferred, residents of any of the state's counties were effectively
guaranteed a transfer out of that county; Baltimore City residents,
however, had no such guarantee because the City's multiple court
system permitted intra-city transfers. 142 The wisdom of the Court
both in reaching and in deciding this constitutional issue in
Davidson is open to serious question. In the first place, that claim
was not a central feature of Davidson as presented to the Court of
Appeals. The equal protection argument was advanced in a short
143
argument at the end of the brief for the appellant in that case.
Although the appellee in Davidson devoted a portion of a good brief
to the equal protection problem, there were other important issues in
the case and attention could not be concentrated on that one issue.
In that posture it is possible that important factual and legal
arguments were not developed for the Court. Such development was
important because in "jumping" Davidson out of the Court of
Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals lost the opportunity to have
the lower court refine and discuss the isses. 1 4 4 Thus, the Court
rendered an important decision without insuring that optimum
conditions for decision-making had been established. Even after
resolution by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals
might have concluded that the issue as presented was not ripe for
decision and exercised its "discretion" not to grant certiorari and
hear the case. 45 If certiorari were granted, the order doing so could
have limited discussion to the equal protection issue and thus
insured that the litigants' attention would be focused on that issue
146
alone.
141. 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975). An excellent review of the case is found in 37
MD. L. REV. 69 (1977).

142. See 37 MD. L. REV. 69, 70 (1977).
143. Only two pages were devoted to the claim. Brief for Appellant at 16-18.
144. See generally Reynolds, supra note 1, at 19-21.
145. See id. at 7-14. Davidson eventually held that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion in not sending the case outside Baltimore City; hence the entire decision
could be said to have been unnecessary.
146. It would also have been possible to secure the assistance of briefs amici
curiae.
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The failure of the Court to set the stage properly before decision
assumes more importance when the method of analysis used in
finding the provision unconstitutional is examined. The Court,
despite its recognition that the party challenging a legislative
classification must adduce proof overcoming the presumption of
validity, 147 stated that the area of removal was one peculiarly within
the realm of judicial expertise; it then took judicial notice of facts
which showed the classification to be invalid. 148 The critic may
wonder whether further briefs from the bar and an opinion from the
Court of Special Appeals may have aided the Court here; certainly,
in the opinion of the dissenting judge, the opinion accomplished "too
14 9
much on a record devoid of supporting evidentiary justification."'
Finally, the decision itself is vulnerable. The Court did not
reexamine its earlier decisions holding that removal from one to
another of the multiple Baltimore City courts satisfied Maryland's
constitution. Given the equal protection problem, however, surely
that inquiry should have taken place. A court should, of course,
always reexamine controlling precedent. Such a reexamination was
particularly important here: first, because federal constitutional
questions should not be reached unless necessary,15° and, second,
because such an inquiry might have led to a reversal of those
precedents. If a reexamination had led to reversal the apparent
purpose of the removal provision - to nullify any jury prejudice
occasioned by plaintiffs selection of a forum' 5 1 - would have been
satisfied. A reversal of those precedents would, arguably, seem
compatible with the language of the provision 52 and conform to the
53
need to construe enactments in accordance with superior law.

147. 276 Md. at 79, 344 A.2d at 437.
148. Id. The Court's application of equal protection law to those justifications is

open to serious criticism. See 37 MD. L. REV. 69, 72-76 (1977).
149. 276 Md. at 88, 344 A.2d at 442 (Murphy, C. J., dissenting).
150. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Ashwander

v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
151. See 33 MD. L. REV. 116, 117 (1973).
152. The constitution only provides for removal "to some other court having
jurisdiction . . .";limiting the number of courts to which the action could be removed
does not necessarily seem inconsistent with that language. 33 MD. L. REV. 116, 118- 19

(1973), argues that the "intent" of the draftsmen of the provision in its current form
(1874) was to permit the removing party to elect to have the case removed to a
different circuit. The wording of the provision, however, does not preclude compulsory

removal to another circuit.
153. The problem of construction to satisfy superior law usually arises in statutory
interpretation, especially in the area of free speech. See, e.g., P. BREST, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 1266 (1975). There appears to be no reason why
the technique should not be used in constitutional cases. In each situation the
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Thus, although it might well have been possible to satisfy the equal
protection clause and section 8 at the same time, 5 4 the Davidson
Court did not actively consider doing so.
The General Assembly responded to Davidson by enacting a law
providing for automatic removal "to a court of some other county
within the circuit or to some other judicial circuit."' 1 5 That law
became effective on July 1, 1976. On September 24 of that year the
Court held the statute unconstitutional, issuing an opinion dated
December 1, 1976. In that case, Perkins v. Eskridge,156 the Court
found that, "although the effect of Davidson was to relegate article
IV, section 8 [of the Maryland constitution] . . . unenforceable by
litigants in civil law actions, it did not have the effect of freeing the
General Assembly from whatever limitations are imposed by that
section.' 16 7 The Court then compared the constitutional provision to
the post-Davidson statute:
Whereas § 6-204(a) provides for removals "to a court of some
other county within the circuit or to some other judicial circuit,"
Article IV, section 8 permits transfers "to some other court"
regardless of whether it is within the circuit. In light of the
express conflict between the two, we discern no manner in which
the law may be harmonized with the constitutional provision,
and thus we have no choice but to declare § 6-204 invalid.1ss
Perkins also represents a combination of hasty decision-making and
questionable analysis. The litigation in Perkins had been transferred
to "some other court" - from Baltimore City to Garrett County.
Although the hearing of an interlocutory appeal was proper, the
Court's opinion did not justify the haste with which the decision was
rendered.
essential question should be: would limiting the provision to conform it to federal law
defeat the purposes for which the provision was enacted?
154. The equal protection argument adopted in Davidson was advanced in 33 MD.

L. REV. 116, 124 n.41. That Recent Decision also suggested the reconciliation set forth
in the text. See id. at 124.
155. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-204 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

156. 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), noted in 37 MD. L. REV. 69 (1977).
157. 278 Md. at 651, 366 A.2d at 40.
158. Id. at 652, 366 A.2d at 40-41. The only other justification offered by the Court
was a reference to Heslop v. State, 202 Md. 123, 95 A.2d 880 (1953). Heslop invalidated
a statute granting an absolute right of removal to defendants in criminal cases. The
problem there was quite different from that in Perkins, however, for MD. CONST. art.
IV, §8 provides that in criminal cases the defendant, in order to remove, must
establish prejudice. Thus, although automatic removal in civil cases is provided for in
the constitution, it is constitutionally forbidden, absent prejudice, in criminal cases.
Perkins does not mention the distinction.
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The Perkins opinion does not tell us what "the express conflict"
between statute and constitution was. Presumably, the problem lay
in the constitution's implied prohibition of transfer to another
"court" within the same circuit. Thus, what was wrong with the
statute was that it prohibited the procedure found defective in
Davidson.5 9 The new statute, however, effectively achieved the
purpose behind the state constitutional provision by permitting the
automatic removal of civil cases from the court in which the action
was filed. At the same time the statute avoided the problem that the
Davidson Court found offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution. Hence, validation of the new statute. was at
least arguably the preferable course, 160 for it kept alive the goal of
automatic removal as much as possible - it "harmonized" the state
constitution with the limits imposed by federal law.' 6 ' That
approach would also have avoided the bizarre result of Perkins and
Davidson when put together: the only effect the constitutional
provision has is to insure that it cannot be implemented. 162 Failure
159. Arguably, the "conflict" inhered in the statute's grant of permission to remove

to another county within the same circuit: is that removal to another "court"? As the
term "court" is commonly used by Maryland lawyers, the answer is, at least arguably,
"yes." The Court of Appeals, for example, referred to a decision rendered in "the
Circuit Court for X County." In any event, if that were the conflict perceived in
Perkins, it raises the same conceptual issue discussed in the text regarding
construction of a state constitutional provision in accordance with federal constitutional law.
160. That result also seems more plausible linguistically, as § 8 does not expressly
prohibit limiting the courts to which an action could be removed - it merely specifies
removal to another court. The suggested interpretation may be more difficult to
square with the possible "intent" of the draftsmen to prevent automatic removal by
litigants outside of Baltimore City. See 33 MD. L. REv. 116, 117 (1973). If that is so, the
question can be formulated this way: would it do more violence to the purpose of the
draftsmen of § 8 to uphold the statute or to eliminate automatic removal? Given the
long history of automatic removal in Maryland, it would appear that the latter option
is the more objectionable on these grounds; what matters, however, is thinking about
the question.
161. The Court of Appeals, in fact, recognized this at the very end of its opinion in
Perkins. Id. at 653, 366 A.2d at 41. The Court had shortly before recognized that it had
a duty to "attempt to harmonize the law with the Constitution." Id. at 652, 366 A.2d at
40. The only place "harmonization" was addressed, however, was in connection with
a discussion of whether "the people of Maryland would intend to relinquish their
direct control over the removal right to the legislature .... " 278 Md. at 649-50, 366
A.2d at 39. That question, whether the legislature is entirely outside its purview, is
different from the inquiry suggested in the text.
"Harmonization" would also have been possible in Davidson by requiring
removal of the Baltimore City litigation to a court outside the city. The Court did not
believe it could do so consistently with the language of the provision, 276 Md. at 82,
344 A.2d at 439, and the possibility of harmonization along those lines was not
discussed.
162. Perkins recognized that the provision could not be implemented. 278 Md. at
651, 366 A.2d at 40.
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to address - and perhaps even to see - that problem may well have

been a function of the Court's rendition of a decision without first
reducing it to writing, a casualty of the rush to judgment.
Taken together, Davidson and Perkins suggest, at best, poor
judgment by the Court in deciding cases when optimum grounds for
good decision-making were not present - with predictable problems
in the resulting opinions. At worst they suggest a court more
interested in reacting to a perceived problem - abuse of automatic
removal 163 - than in understanding the issues presented.
IV. JUDGMENT

The vast majority of legal decisions involve no difficult or
complex problems and it is now commonly recognized that, in terms
of the multitude of legal problems confronted by society, courts see
only the tip of the iceberg. 6 4 While legal problems that ripen into
cases generally involve some difficulty, it is relatively rare for there
to be much dispute concerning the result to be reached. 165 Even those
cases that filter through to the Court of Appeals generally seem
fairly ordinary.16 6 It is in handling difficult cases that the Court
earns its keep: because of their very nature the results in such cases
are arguable, neither "clearly" right or wrong. Good craftsmanship
can ensure that the court sets the problem up correctly, and good
analytic technique can help the court work through the problem
correctly. Without good craftsmanship and without good analytic
techniques, good decisions come only through serendipity. This
Article has attempted to classify and illustrate common problems in
the Court's mode of analysis and craftsmanship. But part of a
judge's job goes further than craftsmanship, requiring evaluation of
closely competing interests and a subtle appreciation of sometimes

163. A hint of this concern is found in the observation in Davidson that the
removal privilege had been abused. 276 Md. at 81, 344 A.2d at 438.
164. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 312-13.
165. Part of this phenomenon can be attributed to the toughness of the "taught
tradition" of common lawyers - our common training leading to common approaches
to problems. See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82-84 (1938). See
also Cardozo's observation, "[iln countless litigations the law is so clear that judges
have no discretion. They have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there are no
gaps." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921).
166. In 1975-76 the Court of Appeals reversed only 48% of the cases coming to it
from the Court of Special Appeals. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 46-47. A different datum
tending to reinforce the same conclusion is that the opinions of the Court of Appeals
were unanimous approximately 75% of the time. Id. at 31-35, 48.
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elusive factors, an exercise that makes judging more art than
167
science.
Of course, most of the problems examined here could be
classified as errors of judgment. It seems, however, that there are
times when a court - collectively - gets off on the wrong track, and
stays there, for reasons that defy classification. Because it is useful
to remember always that a human element is at work in judging, it
is worthwhile to discuss two illustrative cases. 6 8 In the first, it
appears that the judgment of the Court was clearly wrong; in the
second, less clearly so - despite the presence of two forceful
dissents.
The first example, First National Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co.,' 69 presented the Court of Appeals, apparently for the first time,
with the question whether "the public policy of this State" prohibited
insurance coverage of punitive damages for malicious prosecution.
The majority held that it did not, despite a forceful and persuasive
dissent. One reason suggested by the Court to support its conclusion
was the absence of statutory or constitutional guides as to what
constitutes public policy, 170 coupled with a suggestion that a court
should not, except in unusual cases, determine the content of "public
policy.' 7 1 That is wrong, of course, for all common law adjudication
is a recognition and expression of public policy. How else, one
wonders, can developments in tort and contract law be justified? If a
72
court is not in the public policy business it is in no business at all.

167. Much of the earlier discussion on technique can be said to relate to the
exercise of judgment. Thus, a failure to analyze a structural problem, see notes 62 to
106 supra, can also be seen as a failure of "judgment."

168. The two cases in the text are illustrative; others could equally well have been
chosen. E.g., Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 380 A.2d 1052 (1977); State v. Williams,
278 Md. 180, 361 A.2d 122 (1976).
169. 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978).
170. Id. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367.
171. Id.
172. It should not have been unduly difficult for the Court to elaborate standards
for application of public policy. Inquiry into the purposes of malicious prosecution
actions and punitive damages should have provided an answer. An eloquent
statement on the duty of a court to formulate public policy in this area is 8 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1375 (1950).
Ironically, the Court had just prior to First Nat'l Bank made a major effort in
the field of public policy with respect to contracts. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and
Planning Comm. v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978). As
the dissent in First Nat'l Bank pointed out:
[t]he majority has, for some reason, completely ignored the principles laid
down in the Arena decision, resurrecting an ill-defined century old standard
.... Why the majority deems it necessary to abandon controlling authority
barely two months old in favor of such outmoded and patently inadequate
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The problem in First National Bank simply presented one facet of
173
that continued inquiry.
The second and primary theme of the opinion was what the
dissent termed "a noble but rather misplaced solicitude for the
economic well-being of small businessmen": 174 a worry that
unsophisticated shopkeepers, for example, might be financially
ruined by malicious prosecution actions. Two responses to the
argument underlying this concern are in order. The simpler one is
that the goal of punitive damages is to punish in order to deter
further wrongful conduct through fear; 175 thus, in order to achieve
the goal of deterrence, the focus should be on the wrongfulness of the
tortfeasor's conduct, not on the effect of an award on the wrongdoer.
A second response to the majority's concern is that the problem, if
there is one, is with the substantive law of malicious prosecution or
the standard for punitive damages or both.1 76 Those are judicially
created doctrines and it is the task of the Court to see that they work
properly. If small businesses are in danger from those rules then the
rules should be changed. The problem should be attacked at its
source, and if the rules are good they should not be undermined by
permitting insurance coverage in the situation before the Court in
First National Bank. Any other result is a disclaimer of judicial
responsibility to guide and correct the course of the common law.
First National Bank contains many of the problems in
craftsmanship discussed earlier. The Court cited many cases, and
quoted a few at length, but discussed none. The Court relied on very
78
old case law17 7 and commentary, and on questionable authority.
precedent defies explanation and, furthermore, contravenes the principle of

stare decisis.
283 Md. at 244-45 n.2, 389 A.2d at 368 n.2 (Levine, J., dissenting).
173. And, of course, enforcement of the contract in question itself expresses "public
policy."

174. Id. at 247, 389 A.2d at 369 (Levine, J., dissenting). That concern is, on the
facts of the case, hard to understand. As the dissent pointed out with some glee, the

tortfeasor at bar was one of the largest banks in southern Maryland. Id. at 247 n.4,
389 A.2d at 369 n.4.
175. Other goals, e.g., providing a source of attorney's fees for the plaintiff, are

possible. But the majority focused on prevention and deterrence. Id. at 232, 389 A.2d
at 361.
176. Maryland law in this area may be harsher than that of most jurisdictions, see
First Nat'l Bank v. Todd, 283 Md. 251, 255-56, 389 A.2d 371, 374 (1978), and change
may be in order. Such change could not have been accomplished in First Nat'l Bank
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. because the issues had not been preserved for appeal. Id.
That background makes the Court's concern for small business in this case even more
curious.
177. This fact was noted by the dissent. See note 172 supra.
178. E.g., the works referred to at 283 Md. at 238-40, 389 A.2d at 364-65. Another
example, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930), quoted in First Nat'l Bank
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But most disheartening was the failure of the Court to come to grips
with its role in government and its responsibility for channeling the
content of judge-made law. That failure apparently stemmed from its
"noble, but misplaced" preoccupation with the impact of the decision
on small businesses, an error in judgment that infected the result.
The second example, and the more difficult one to deal with, is
Johnson v. State.179 The majority opinion there is generally well
crafted. The Court examined policies in detail, noted contrary
authority, and took responsibility properly upon itself. The decision,
however, can be questioned. The petitioner in Johnson, wanted on a
number of criminal charges, turned himself in to police in
Annapolis. After he had rested in a cell (at his request) for about
eighteen hours, his interrogation began. Six hours later, and twentyfour and one-half hours after his surrender, Johnson signed a
lengthy incriminating statement. He was then taken to a commissioner for his initial appearance in court - even though a
commissioner had apparently been available at all times only a
short distance away. Shortly thereafter, Johnson confessed outright
to a shooting and robbery. 180 At the time, Maryland District Rule
709a 1 8l provided:
A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be
taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in
no event later than the earlier of (1) 24 hours after arrest or (2)
the first session of court after the defendant's arrest upon a
warrant or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant,
the first session of court after the charging document is filed. A
charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not
already filed.
On these facts the Court held that: 1) rule 709a was mandatory,
and had been violated on the facts described; 2) an exclusionary rule
must be applied to all statements obtained during a period of
unnecessary delay in bringing a person before a judicial officer after
he has been arrested. The first part of the holding seems reasona-

v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d at 365, involved a completely

different question: the "public policy" implications of the waiver of a twelfth juror in a
criminal trial.
179. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
180. The statement of facts comes from id. at 317-18, 384 A.2d at 711-12.
181. The rule is currently identified as MD. DIST. R. 723a. The change in
designation was not accompanied by a change in substance, as the Court pointed out.
282 Md. at 316 n.1, 384 A.2d at 710 n.1.
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ble, l8 2 as is the Court's method of reaching it - by an examination
of "the role played by the initial appearance in our system of
justice," 18 3 and then relating that role to the purpose of the rule in
question.
The Court's decision to adopt an exclusionary rule, however,
requires a different conclusion. It can be traced back - as the Court
did - to Mallory v. United States184 and McNabb v. United
States, 8 5 two cases that represent an attempt by the Supreme Court
to deal with problems involving confessions in federal criminal
prosecutions in the early days of the "revolution" in criminal
procedure that culminated in Miranda v. Arizona. 8 6 Since then,
however, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus of its inquiry from
rigid, prophylactic rules to an inquiry into the voluntariness of the
proffered confession. 8 7 The shift in focus, as the Court of Appeals
noted, would permit the introduction of statements if voluntary. As a
result "the vast majority of state courts passing on the question have
rejected McNabb-Mallory outright, opting instead for a traditional
' 88
due process voluntariness test of the admissibility of confessions."'
The Court of Appeals, however, noted that "several states have
elected in recent years to adopt a per se exclusionary rule in order to
combat what many perceive to be an increase in the number of
flagrant violations of the prompt production requirements."'' 8 9 The
Court then asserted that the exclusionary rule serves the goals of
deterrence of such violations' 90 and prevention of "the debasement of
the judicial process,"' 9' and concluded that statements made by a
defendant' 92 more than twenty-four hours after his arrest were per se
excludable while statements made within the period but before
presentment should be tested by an "unnecessary delay" standard.

182. The Court began its discussion with an analysis of language based on
"principles of statutory construction." Id. at 320-21, 384 A.2d at 713. That analysis,
however, does not appear to be the major underpinning of that part of the holding.
183. Id. at 321, 384 A.2d at 713.
184. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
185. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
186. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
187. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in The Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99,
168-69.
188. 282 Md. at 324, 384 A.2d at 715.
189. Id. at 325, 384 A.2d at 715.
190. Id. at 326, 384 A.2d at 716.
191. Id.

192. Both majority and dissent use the term "arrestee." The reader can only hope
that another bit of jargon will not be added to an overburdened tongue.
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It is difficult to agree with that result. In the first place, the
result is one that has been rejected by most courts, state and
federal. 193 Although the Court recognized the widespread rejection of
a per se exclusionary rule, it did not delve deeply into the reasons for
that rejection. Further, the Court talked of the need for an
exclusionary rule in order to deter illegal police action and prevent
judicial debasement, but did not show that such problems exist in
Maryland. Nor did the Court show that exclusion would in fact deter
such conduct. In Johnson, the defendant, before making his
statement, was twice given Miranda warnings, and, as the Court
noted, there was "no substantial evidence" that the police coerced
the defendant or elicited the confession by deception. In the absence
of some hard evidence of abuse in this state (and not simply a
reference to problems that may exist in some other jurisdictions), it
is difficult to understand the imposition of an exclusionary rule for
94
this reason.
A third argument found in the majority opinion' 95 must, then,
justify the rule. That argument centers on the beneficial impact of a
"rights" warning from a judicial officer. That impact, however, does
not argue strongly for an exclusionary rule because the absence of
the warning goes to the question of voluntariness. In addition, the
commitment of the Court to the value of the judicial admonition is
questionable, for the majority suggested a number of situations in
which delay not caused by physical problems might be "necessary."'196 If the Court believed strongly in the potency of the judicial
warning it would simply exclude all confessions made before that
warning. Its unwillingness to go that far suggests that it simply had
not thought through the problem sufficiently.
A final problem of judgment in Johnson was the use of the facts
of the case to establish a prophylactic rule for delays longer than
twenty-four hours.197 Normally, a court with discretionaryjurisdic-

193. Cf. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976)
(the Court relied heavily on the fact that strict liability in tort had been adopted in
most other states). Phipps is discussed at notes 123 to 133 and accompanying text
supra.
194. The "debasement" argument becomes circular, of course, if no such
misconduct exists.
195. 282 Md. at 322, 384 A.2d at 713-14.
196. Id. at 329, 384 A.2d at 717.
197. A problem that will not be discussed concerns the involvement of the Court of
Appeals in the promulgation of the rule in question. Some practical problems are
pointed out by one dissent. See 282 Md. at 347-50, 384 A.2d at 727-28 (Murphy, C.J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the dissent argued that even under the majority's per se rule, the
statements should not have been per se excluded because the defendant confessed
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tion would wait until it was presented a compelling case for review;
the facts in Johnson, however, did not present such a case. Further,
from the facts as stated by the majority, Johnson, leaving aside his
"rest" period, was closeted continually with police, apparently while
making a statement. That process lasted six hours. It is difficult to
understand the value of a rule that would apparently permit the
introduction of a statement made in those circumstances by a person
in custody who did not sleep following his arrest, but not that made
by Johnson. There simply is no functional difference between the
two, and, in the absence of police compulsion, no reason to
distinguish them. From that observation it can be seen that the
twenty-four hour prophylactic rule eventually established by the
Court makes little sense. If the Court was worried about police
compulsion there was no reason for it to distinguish between cases
on the basis of whether twenty-four hours had elapsed. In short, the
violation here seems so de minimis, so "technical", as to suggest that
the Court of Appeals was seeking a case to establish its rule. That
inference suggests another: that "twenty-four hour cases" are so
rare1 98 as to cast doubt on the need for the prophylactic rule
established by the case.
Most of the problems with the majority opinion in Johnson were
pointed out in the dissenting opinions. Why, then, did the majority
persist in its effort to establish an exclusionary rule? While a number
of reasons can be postulated, one important factor was the failure of
the majority to analyze the policy of its rule in terms of any
demonstrated need for it. That failure was perhaps caused by an
intuitive leap in the decision-making process, a leap from the duty
imposed on police to present arrested persons promptly to the
creation of a complete remedy for violation of that duty, a remedy
whose content seems to reflect an hypnotic fascination with a time
period contained in a rule of the Court.
V.

THE ROLE OF THE BAR

A court depends upon its bar for basic research and for the
organization of a problem into a form that can be readily
comprehended. While a court may in any case reject the posture of
the problem as presented by counsel, careful preparation by the bar
is necessary if a court is to perform satisfactorily its institutional

orally before thv lapse of the 24-hour period. Id. at 348-49, 384 A.2d at 728 (Murphy,
C.J., dissenting).
198. Johnson is the only reported case involving the prompt presentment rule.

1978]

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

functions. 199 Unfortunately, the bar fails all too often in this task. A
number of good briefs have been filed in recent terms, but there have
also been a number of briefs that were quite simply bad. Bad briefs
require the Court to. develop its own theory of the case and conduct
its own search through the record. Bad briefs mean that opposing
views are not subjected to the rigorous analysis that the adversarial
process can provide.
Although truly bad briefs have been rare, many can best be
labeled mediocre - briefs that recited the facts and hornbook law
well enough but did not adequately analyze the problems raised by
the case. Indeed, much of the mechanical treatment of problems by
the Court perhaps can be traced to the apparent confusion among
the bar concerning the difference between stare decisis and stare
dictis.2- Until the bar improves the quality of the work it submits, 2° 1
the Court of Appeals will be handicapped in realizing its potential.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has been in preparation off and on for two years.
During that time initial pleasure over the quality of the Court's work
was replaced by disappointment that it was not availing itself fully
of the opportunities provided by its relatively light caseload to think
about its role as the highest court of a state. An overburdened court
can be excused for some of the shortcomings described in this part of
the Article, but that excuse is not available to the present Court of
Appeals.
Still, the critic often tends to dwell too much in the negative. It is
worth repeating 202 that the Court performs its basic job quite well. At
argument the Court is well-informed and incisive. Its opinions are to
a very large degree well-written and understandable. Of more
importance, the Court does not let the dead weight of the past hold it
back. The willingness of the Court to resist the routine of the job is
perhaps its most impressive accompfishment. It ungrudgingly
199. See generally Re, The Partnershipof Bench and Bar, 16 CATH. LAw. 194
(1970).

200. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here, for most attorneys will frame their
briefs to respond to what they expect the Court wants.
201. A number of solutions are possible. One, a specialized appellate bar does not
seem possible in Maryland; apart from institutional litigants such as the Attorney
General or the Public Defender, it is doubtful that there is sufficient work available to
support such a bar. The Court of Appeals does have the power, however, to express its
displeasure with the work of an attorney. While extreme sanctions such as public
censure should be handled with great care, surely the Court can refuse, for example, to
accept inadequate work.
202. See text accompanying notes 20 to 21 & 62 to 63 supra.
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implements Supreme Court decisions. 2 3 Finally, the opinions
generally show a real effort to reach solutions to problems, an effort
not based on ideological reaction, but instead on an attempt at
comprehension. Despite some problems of craftsmanship the Court
is a good one. If the Court of Appeals were to take advantage of the
opportunities provided by the control it has over its own docket, it
could be a very good one indeed. Forty years ago, Dean Wigmore
placed the Court of Appeals of Maryland in his top category of state
courts. 2 4 While perhaps only Wigmore could attempt a comparison
of all state courts, a scattered reading of cases from other
jurisdictions does suggest that the Court, in comparative terms,
would not fare badly today.
Many opinions over the past several years could be singled out
for special praise. Sard v. Hardy,2 0 5 for example, was a fine
discussion of the informed consent and express warranty problems
in doctor/patient litigation. The discussion of statutory severability
in Ocean City Taxpayers v. Mayor of Ocean City2 0 6 provided a sound
theoretical grounding for the decision, as did the analytic framework
set up by the Court in Perkins v. Eskridge2 7 to solve the question
whether there is any residual effect to a state constitutional
provision held invalid under the Federal Constitution. Interesting
also was the Court's workmanlike analysis of the multipronged
constitutional attack on the new Maryland Medical Malpractice
Arbitration Act.208 State v. Evans2 9 provided a sound, thorough
reworking of the allocation of burden of proof in criminal cases,
following the changes set in motion by the Supreme Court in
211
Mullaney v. Wilbur 2 10 and Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp.

203. See, e.g., Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d
222 (1976). See generally Frank & McManus, BalancingAlmost Two Hundred Years
of Economic Policy Against Contemporary Due Process Standards - Mechanics'
Liens in Maryland After Barry Properties, 36 MD. L. REV. 733 (1977).
204. Wigmore, Grading Our State Supreme Courts: A Tentative Method, 22
A.B.A.J. 227 (1936). Forty-six jurisdictions were evaluated on the basis of their
evidence opinions. These were divided into four groups. Maryland's group, the
highest, had 19 members. Special praise was given to 23 judges, one of whom was
Judge Parke of the Maryland Court of Appeals. Id. at 231.
205. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
206. 280 Md. 585, 375 A.2d 541 (1977).
207. 278 Md. 619, 366 A.2d 21 (1976), noted in 37 MD. L. REv. 69 (1977).
208. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 168, 385 A.2d 57 (1978). The opinion does,
however, have a number of problems in craftsmanship.
209. 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976).
210. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
211. 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977). Particularly impressive was the Court's
handling of the Robinson-Patman Act, analyzing for itself the impact of that most
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was a showpiece opinion, deftly analyzing a number of thorny
federal constitutional and statutory problems.
In its long and distinguished history the Court of Appeals of
2 12
Alvey, 213
Maryland has been graced by names such as Chase,
Parke, 214 and Bond. 215 This year the Court celebrates its bicentennial. 216 The judges of the Court today, primarily because of the
control they can exercise over their own caseload, have the
opportunity to carry on in the fine tradition of their predecessors. It
is a good court, but it can be better. It is hoped that this Article will
help stimulate interest in the Court and lead to a tradition of
scholarly analysis of its product.

difficult federal law. Id. at 444-53, 370 A.2d at 1121-25. The Exxon decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
The decision of the Court of Appeals was also adopted by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 533, 376 A.2d 118 (1977).
212. Jeremiah Townley Chase (Chief Judge, 1806-1824), author of Whittington v.
Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802), a very early authority for judicial review. See P.
CLARKSON & R. JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 198-200 (1970).
213. Richard Henry Alvey (Associate Judge, 1867-1883; Chief Judge 1883-1893).
Judge Bond wrote that President Cleveland planned to appoint Alvey to the Supreme
Court, but that the nomination was blocked by one of Maryland's Senators. See C.
BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY

181 (1928).

214. Francis Neal Parke (Associate Judge, 1924-1941). See note 204 supra.
215. Carroll Taney Bond (Chief Judge, 1924-1943). See Lewis, Roundtable
Reminiscenses II, 9 MD. B.J. 4 (1976).
216. C. BOND, supra note 213, at 63.

